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Just Hangin' Around: Gangs and Due
Process Vagueness in City of Chicago v.
Morales
In City of Chicago v. Morales,1 the Supreme Court revisited the issue
of the constitutionality of municipal and state loitering laws. In this
case the Court was presented with a Chicago municipal ordinance that
prohibited individuals from loitering with known gang members. The
Court struck down the ordinance as overly vague under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' It found that the law gave too
much discretion to police officers charged with its enforcement and did
not define its crucial terms specifically enough.4 The Court was closely
divided, however, and both the concurring and dissenting Justices gave
cities suggestions for altering their loitering ordinances to make them
conform to constitutional requirements.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1992 the Chicago City Council faced a major problem-gang
violence was on the rise, and the police had stated they were unable to
combat it under the existing city ordinances. The problem was that
gang members simply loitered on corners and on sidewalks while the
police were in view. Then they terrorized neighborhood residents and
participated in drug deals when the police were out of sight. The city
held hearings in which residents, police, and alderpersons could voice
their concerns. These hearings led the council to pass the Gang
Ordinance, better known as the "gang-loitering ordiCongregation
"6
nance.
The ordinance established a four-part criminal offense punishable with
a $500 fine, imprisonment of 6 months or less, and a 120 hour communi-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
Id. at 1854.
Id. at 1863.
Id. at 1859-63.
Id. at 1856-63, 1867-87.
Id.; see also City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 36 (I1. App. Ct. 1995).
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ty service requirement.7 First, a police officer must reasonably suspect
at least one of a group of two or more individuals in a "'public place'" to
be a "'criminal street gang membe[r].' 5 Second, the officer must
observe these individuals "'loitering,'" which is defined as "'remain[ing]
in any one place with no apparent purpose.'" 9 Third, the officer must
order all the individuals to disperse "'from the area.'" 10 Finally, at least
one person must refuse to comply with the officer's order of dispersal."
Whether the individuals who refuse to move along are gang members or
not is irrelevant to their liability for prosecution under this statute. 12
During the initial drafting of the ordinance, the Chicago Police
Department successfully lobbied the City Council to purposefully leave
the wording broad because the police wanted to develop in-house policies
to govern the ordinance's enforcement and better meet their needs. 3
Two months after the City Council adopted the ordinance, the police
department set up guidelines for enforcing it by establishing General
Order 92-4.' The order limited who within the department had the
power to arrest under the ordinance, set forth criteria for defining a
street gang and what membership in a gang entailed, and outlined the
particular high-crime areas of the city where the ordinance would be
enforced.15
Morales was a consolidation of a number of different cases brought
before Illinois trial courts. In each of these cases at least one individual
was arrested for violating the Gang Congregation Ordinance. During
the three years the ordinance was in effect, the police issued in excess
of eighty-nine thousand orders for dispersal.'
These warnings
culminated in forty-two thousand arrests. During this time two trial
judges held the ordinance to be constitutional while eleven found that it
was not. 7

This consolidated appeal involved seventy different defendants charged
under the Gang Congregation Ordinance." It included both cases in
which the trial court ruled the ordinance was a valid exercise of the

7. 119 S. Ct. at 1854 n.2.

8. Id. (quoting
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)) (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58-59 (Ill. 1997).
119 S. Ct. at 1855.
Id.
Id. The ordinance was in effect from 1993-1995. Id. at 1855 n.6.
Id.
687 N.E.2d at 57.
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city's power and the cases in which it was judged to be invalid.19 The
court of appeals found the ordinance to be invalid.20 The court held
that the ordinance violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section Five of the Illinois Constitution
because it offended the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression.2 ' Likewise, the court held the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 22 Finally, the court held the ordinance was unconstitutional because it punished a status crime and violated the Fourth
Amendment by allowing an officer to arrest a suspect without probable
cause.23 The court sympathized with the city's efforts to eradicate gang
violence, but stated that "our constitutional standards, fortunately, do
not slide up and down a scale according to the gravity of the crime
problem we wish to combat. If it were otherwise, the fundamental
ideals
24
on which this country is based would slowly deteriorate."
The City appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the
ruling of the court of appeals.25 The Illinois Supreme Court found for
defendants, but on a narrower ground than that of the court of
appeals. 26 The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause because it was vague on its face and
because it arbitrarily restricted personal liberties.27 It found that the
gang-loitering ordinance violated both the adequate notice and nondiscriminatory enforcement requirements of the Due Process Clause.2"
Thus, the court had no need to reach the other issues that the court of
appeals examined.29
The City again appealed the case, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 30 A divided Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling of the lower courts."' Six Justices agreed with the judgment,
and three Justices filed concurring opinions. 2 Three Justices dissent19. 119 S. Ct. at 1855.
20. 660 N.E.2d at 36.

21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
joined

Id. at 42-43.
119 S. Ct. at 1856.
Id.
687 N.E.2d at 59.
Id. at 60-64.
Id. at 59.
119 S. Ct. at 1856.
Id. at 1854, 1856.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Souter and Ginsburg
as to Parts III, IV, and VI. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence, which was joined
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ed.33 The majority found that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague on its face because it failed "to establish standards for the police
and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation
of liberty interests."34 In doing so the Court held that "the freedom to
loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 5 However, the Court
agreed with the City that the law did not infringe upon the First
Amendment interests found by the Illinois Court of Appeals.36 The
majority did not comment on the Fourth Amendment and status
arguments upon which the court of appeals relied.37
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Loitering laws predate the founding of America. In fact, laws that
deal with criminalizing vagrancy and loitering trace their roots to the
breakup of feudalism and to the Black Plague in England over five
hundred years ago."
Initially, vagrancy laws had the economic
rationale of establishing a fixed wage by preventing laborers from
traveling to neighboring communities where labor was more scarce and
wages were higher.39 As time passed, increasingly large numbers of
people became poor and unemployed and filled English roads to steal
from those who traveled along them.' Loitering laws then became a
force for crime prevention.41 As America became populated by people
from England and other parts of Europe, these loitering laws were
adopted with a focus on criminal punishment.4 2
This focus on crime prevention remains the most common reason for
passing loitering laws today.' They are used for a variety of reasons,
from stopping drug dealers and prostitutes from frequenting an area, to
preventing the obstruction of public passageways, to allowing the police

by Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer also wrote a concurrence, as did Justice Kennedy.
33. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, and Justice Thomas wrote another
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
34. 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1857-63.
38. Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of
Vagueness and Ouerbreadthin Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 385 (1995).
39. Id. at 385-86.
40. Id. at 386.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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considered criminals,
to "control persons who, although not traditionally
44
were nonetheless considered undesirable."
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has been asked
on numerous occasions to review cases in which a defendant was
convicted under a loitering ordinance. Over the years the Court has
continuously narrowed what and whom a city or state is allowed to
punish under this type of regulation. The following cases are not an
exhaustive list of the loitering cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, but
they are the most representative of the Court's outlook towards due
process vagueness in loitering laws. Vagueness may invalidate a
criminal law in one of the two following ways: (1) if the law fails to
provide sufficient notice for an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence
to comply, or (2) if the law encourages "discriminatory enforcement" by
police and prosecution.45
The first time the Supreme Court directly addressed a loitering
Thornhill involved an
ordinance was in Thornhill v. Alabama."
Alabama statute that prohibited loitering of those who were picketing or
protesting in conjunction with union activities.47 The majority reversed
defendant's conviction on the ground that the statute swept too broadly
and prohibited otherwise lawful conduct that would be protected by the
First Amendment. 48 The Court also believed that the statute violated
due process by granting the police too much discretion and "readily len[t]
itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."
In 1965 the Court once again visited the area of loitering law. In
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,"° the Court found there was no
evidence to support defendant's conviction under a Birmingham loitering
ordinance.5 " In dicta the Court stated that a literal reading of the
second part of the ordinance meant that "a person may stand on a public
sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that
city."2 This type of law, the Court believed, "bears the hallmark of a

44. Id. at 386-87.
45. 119 S. Ct. at 1859.
46.

310 U.S. 88 (1940).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 97-98.
382 U.S. 87 (1965).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 90. The second part of the ordinance stated, "'It shall also be unlawful for

any person to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having been
requested by any police officer to move on.'" Id. at 88 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN.
CrrY CODE § 1142).
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police state."" Merely refusing to comply with an officer's request to
disperse would not be sufficient to arrest someone for the offense of
loitering.'
In 1972 the Supreme Court handed down a ruling that set forth the
seminal rule in judging all loitering cases. In Papachristouv. City of
Jacksonville," the Court reversed the conviction of eight defendants
under a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy statute, finding the ordinance to
The Court
be void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause.
doctrine
to
invalidate
relied upon both bases of the void for vagueness
57
this ordinance. First, it stated that the ordinance simply did not give
sufficient notice to defendants of what was prohibited conduct.58 The
activities set forth as those deserving of punishment "are historically
part of the amenities of life as we have known them ... giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence ... [that] have

dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists."" Thus, much of the conduct made criminal was generally
considered to be innocent conduct.60 Second, the Court found that the
ordinance encouraged "arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." 1
The Court believed that the drafters in Jacksonville had purposefully
written this ordinance with expansive breadth to increase its police's
arresting power. 2 It enabled "'men to be caught who are vaguely

53.

382 U.S. at 91.

54.
55.
56.

Id.
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Id. at 162.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 164.
60. Id. at 163. At the time of defendants' convictions the Jacksonville Ordinance Code
§ 26-57 provided as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common
drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places,
common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons,
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings
of their wives or minor children ....

Id. at 156 n. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. at 165.
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undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense."'"
Implicit in the Papachristouruling was that cities and states could not
pass loitering laws simply as a way of increasing their power to arrest.
Likewise, it carried with it the requirement that the state narrowly
define who fell within the ordinance and ensure that the person's actual
conduct at least in some way constituted a recognizable offense."
In 1971, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,' the Supreme Court
examined a Cincinnati loitering ordinance, again applying a void for
vagueness test." In Coates a group was arrested for demonstrating
The Court believed the ordinance was
during a labor dispute.
"unconstitutionally vague because it subject[ed] the exercise of the right
of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally
broad because it authorize[d] the punishment of constitutionally
The vague term in Coates was "annoy."69 The
protected conduct."
police were allowed to arrest individuals who were loitering and
70
conducting themselves in a way that was "annoying" to passersby.
The Court found this unacceptable because a person's guilt or innocence
should not depend upon "whether or not a policeman [was] annoyed."71
The criminalization of innocent conduct was the downfall of the
ordinance.72
One year later in Colten v. Kentucky,75 the Court made one of its few
rulings favorably construing a loitering law.7 ' In Colten defendant was
arrested for talking to a police officer and for failing to disperse when
the officer repeatedly asked him to do so while his friend was receiving
a traffic ticket. Defendant was arrested under a Kentucky statute for
disorderly conduct. As written, the offense included a loitering
component.76 The Court determined that defendant was arrested
properly because he was not engaged in First Amendment conduct and

63.

Id. at 166 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,

dissenting)).
64. Id. at 165.
65. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
66. Id. at 614.
67. Id at 612.
68. Id. at 614.
69. Id. at 612, 614.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id. at 615.
73. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
74. Id. at 120.
75. Id. at 106-08.
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because "[hie had no constitutional right to observe the issuance of a
traffic ticket or to engage the issuing officer in conversation."7" The
Court found the ordinance was not vague because defendant should have
known that he would be subject to arrest after he failed to move on
when asked to do so. 77
During the seventeen years between Colten and Morales, the Supreme
Court had little to say about the status of loitering laws. However, there
was a great deal of litigation at the state level with respect to these
laws. Thus, in Morales the Court considered several recent state cases.
The following are two of those decisions.
In City of Tacoma v. Luvene,7" the Supreme Court of Washington
reviewed a Tacoma municipal ordinance criminalizing "drug loitering."79 Defendants were three men who had been standing in the
middle of an intersection trying to flag down cars. One of the cars
stopped, and the police officer saw an exchange of a clear plastic bag
apparently containing rock cocaine. Defendant Luvene was later seen
in the company of a man smoking a crack pipe and was then arrested for
drug loitering.80
The court found the ordinance constitutional because "an ordinance
that prohibits loitering may survive an overbreadth challenge if it
requires the specific intent to engage in an illicit act."8 ' Thus, because
the ordinance prohibited loitering by individuals who intended to sell or
use illegal narcotics, it passed this test. 2 The ordinance also passed
the vagueness challenge because it required the police to single out
individuals not only because they were loitering, but also because they
were involved in drug activity.8 3 The ordinance gave suspects notice
that they could be subject to arrest if they were connected to drugs in
any way in a public setting.
However, in Nevada v. Richard,"4 the Supreme Court of Nevada
found that a state statute violated the rights of four homeless people and
their advocates who were arrested not for some particular activity, but
simply for being vagrants.8 8 The court found the statute to be vague

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992).
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1376-77.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1385.
836 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1992).
Id. at 623-24.
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because it failed to give adequate notice of what illegal activity was to
be punished.8
III. RATIONALE
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Chicago ordinance in
Morales rested on the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme
Court did not concern itself with First Amendment freedoms, overbreadth, or status crimes. 8 It found First Amendment freedoms were
not applicable here because the statute did not abridge either the
freedom of speech or association. 9 The Court barely addressed
overbreadth or status crimes. 9° Instead, the Court invalidated the
ordinance solely because it found sufficient evidence of a violation of the
Due Process Clause based on vagueness.91
The Court began with the presumption that "the freedom to loiter for
innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."92 This does not mean that the
Court believes loitering is a substantive due process right that would
raise the scrutiny level for the examination of loitering laws.93 Instead,
this was simply the Court's way of placing the freedom to loiter within
the greater "liberty" concept of "life, liberty, or property" within the Due
Process Clause.' Though this helped somewhat to bolster the Court's
rationale that loitering is covered under the Due Process Clause, it also
has led to some confusion about whether loitering should be considered
a fundamental right.
The Court then held that Chicago's loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.95 Vagueness offends the Due Process Clause because
it allows individuals to be arrested for acts they may not recognize as
criminal.9
It can also cause a chilling effect for people asserting
constitutionally protected rights if they do not know whether their acts
are criminal.97 Finally, it can allow police to discriminate unfairly

86. Id. at 624.
87. 119 S. Ct. at 1857-63.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1857.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1857 n.19.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
119 S. Ct. at 1859-61.
Id. at 1859.
Id.
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according to their own biases.98 The Court stated that vagueness may
invalidate a criminal law in one of the two following ways: (1) if the law
fails to provide sufficient notice for an ordinary person of reasonable
intelligence to comply, or (2) if the law encourages "discriminatory
enforcement" by police and prosecution. 9
Its rationale
The Court found a violation of both approaches." °
behind invalidating the ordinance on the first ground was based on the
definitions of the words in the statute. 10' To begin, the Court cited the
term "loiter" as a problem. 2 "It is difficult to imagine how any citizen
of the city of Chicago standing in a public place with a group of people
would know if he or she had an 'apparent purpose.'"'03 The problem
then becomes not that loitering itself has been criminalized, but just
what type of loitering the city had in mind.'( The Court was bothered
because the definition of "loitering" encompassed a great deal of
harmless conduct and, in doing so, excluded "from its coverage much of
the intimidating conduct that motivated its enactment."0 5 The Court
referenced the state cases discussed above,"° declaring that state
courts have held that loitering laws without a separate criminal element
are overly vague and thus invalid. 07 The Court was equally troubled
by the vagueness in the order of dispersal, the identification of a
"criminal street gang" member, and the standards of "neighborhood" and
Thus, because the Court found that "the entire ordinance
"locality."'

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1857-64.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1859. The definition of "loiter" in the ordinance is "'to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose.'" Id. at 1854 n.2 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 84-015(cX1)).

103. Id. at 1859.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 1862.

106. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 1860.
108. Id. The dispersal order involved a police officer instructing "'all such person to
disperse and remove themselves from the area.'" Id. The definition of a "criminal street
gang" is:
"[Any ongoing organization, association in fact or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial activities the
commission of one or more or the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern
of criminal gang activity."
Id. at 1854 n.2 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(2)).
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fail[ed] to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden
°
and what is permitted," it was invalid.'O
The Court further held that the ordinance violated the second basis for
vagueness-overly broad police discretion leading to arbitrary enforcement. ° "[Tihe principal source of the vast discretion conferred on the
police in this case is the definition of loitering as 'to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose.'""' Thus, the police could arrest
anyone whom they believed to be standing without an apparent purpose
in the company of a gang member."2 As in Papachristou the Court
asked whether we want to be able to stand on a street corner only at the
whim of a police officer." 3
Finally, the Court answered the City's argument that all these defects
were cured because the police must first order a person to move on, and
then that person must disobey the order before an arrest could take
place." 4 The Court found this unpersuasive because the dispersal
order itself was vague and because previous cases held that a dispersal
order alone does not cure the deficiencies in an invalid loitering law."5
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joined, concurred in the
judgment and in part of the opinion. 116 Justice O'Connor was most
concerned with the broad discretion and minimal guidelines that the
ordinance offered law enforcement officers." 7 In particular, she was
concerned with the discretion allowed to police officers concerning the
phrase "with no apparent purpose" and in determining who was a gang
member."' She worried that it "permits police officers to choose which
purposes are permissible" and who was to be considered a gang
member."9 Finally, she emphasized that Chicago still has other
alternatives for curbing gang violence, most of which are already present
in current laws, specifically the city's general disorderly conduct
ordinance that allows arrests of "those
who knowingly 'provoke, make or
20
aid in making a breach of peace.''

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1861.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1861-62.
Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1863-65.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
at 1863.
at 1863-64.
at 1864.
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In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it "would reach a broad range of innocent
conduct."12 1 Justice Breyer emphasized that the ordinance left police
officers with an amount of discretion that created a major rather than
a "minor limitation upon the free state of nature."'22
Justice Scalia's dissent focused mainly on the impossibility of
invalidating the ordinance on its face under existing constitutional
jurisprudence. 2 ' Justice Scalia stated that the test for a facial
challenge is to show the law is "unenforceable in all its applications, and
not just in its particular application to the party in suit."'2 4 He stated
that the law's challengers had not presented a compelling argument that
all applications of the loitering ordinance would be invalid.'2 5 Justice
Scalia also posited that there has never been a fundamental right to
loiter and that such a right was invented by the majority to further its
purpose in invalidating the ordinance.'2 6 However, it seems that the
majority was not insisting that loitering is a substantive due process
of the general liberty
fundamental right, but instead is simply part
127
interest inherent in the Due Process Clause.
Justice Thomas's dissent argued two main points. First, throughout
history there has never been a right to loiter. In fact, quite to the
contrary, there have always been laws against loitering. 2 ' Second,
Justice Thomas stressed the needs of the community and its due process
gang members and their companions
rights as overriding those of1the
29
who are loitering on corners.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Morales is in many ways just one more link in a long chain of loitering
jurisprudence. As in so many cases before it, the decision in Morales
leads the Court further away from upholding a loitering statute. The
days of broad vagrancy ordinances as a way to "clean up our streets" are
over. No longer will the Court allow police and prosecutors so much
discretion.

121. Id. at 1865 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1867-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1867-68.
125. Id. at 1871.
126. Id. at 1871-74.
127. 119 S. Ct. at 1857 n.19.
128. Id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1879-81.
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However, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, suggesting to cities that they
establish loitering laws that require either some "harmful purpose" or
the "intimidat[ion of] residents," along with the two dissents gives
loitering laws a possible future.13 ° In fact, Mayor Richard M. Daley of
Chicago stated that the Court's decision was not a major setback for this
legislation. 131 "We will go back and correct it, and then move forward,"
said Daley.132 The city's corporate counsel went so far as to state that
he was "very encouraged" by Justice O'Connor's concurrence and the
dissents for giving the city a "road map" to write a loitering law that
would pass constitutional muster.' 33
In his article concerning Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance,
Peter Poulos set forth several suggestions for cities desiring to write a
loitering ordinance.' 3' Poulos stated that "in order to survive constitutional attack, an ordinance must do more than merely distinguish gang
[It] must adequately
members based solely on their status as such ....
distinguish between activity that actually prevents citizens from using
public streets and places, and activity that is generally innocent or
constitutionally protected."'35
Poulos stated that first, cities must eliminate the requirement of two
or more people because this requirement only heightens judicial
scrutiny.' 36 Second, they must exclude the requirement that at least
one of the individuals be a gang member, for this reaches a great deal
of innocent behavior and may be a violation of the Eighth Amendment
because it criminalizes status.'37 Finally, cities must "distinguish
between activity that reasonably deters citizens from using public streets
and places, and activity that is generally innocent or constitutionally
protected."' 38
Using the suggestions put forth by Justice O'Connor and by Poulos,
cities might craft an ordinance similar to the following:
Any person or persons who are engaged in unlawful activities and/or
are in the process of or have just previously been involved in the
intimidation of neighborhood residents or passersby may be asked to

130. Id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
131. Jan C. Greenburg, Top Court Ruling Shows Way to a Legal Anti-Loitering Law,
CHI. TRM., June 11, 1999, at N1, availablein 1999 WL 2882161.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Poulos, supra note 38, at 413-17.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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remove themselves from the immediate area and refrain from intimidation or be detained and charged by the police for failure to comply with
such an order.
Unlawful activities shall be defined as drug-related activities,
prostitution, gang-related activities for which there is a criminal
penalty, disorderly conduct, or any other activities that violate either
a city, state, or federal criminal ordinance or statute. Those charged
under this Act may also be charged with any of the offenses mentioned
herein if there is sufficient evidence for such a charge.

Such an ordinance would still face a number of hurdles, including the
vagueness of terms such as "intimidation," "justpreviously," and "remove
themselves from the immediate area." Likewise, opponents may
question its necessity at all, for if a loitering statute must include the
requirement of an unlawful act, could the offender not merely be charged
with the unlawful act? In fact, the Chicago police made this same
objection. In an article in the Chicago Tribune, officers were cited as
saying that while the ordinance was helpful, it has not really been used
in the four years since the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated it.'39
"They acknowledged that in most cases they can accomplish the same
[result as before] by arresting gang members on disorderly conduct,
obstructing traffic and other misdemeanor charges or by staking out
street corners and using other strategies ... and 'we haven't violated
anyone's civil rights.'"'"
It is probably safest for cities and states to steer clear of loitering laws
altogether. However, this is much easier said than done. Loitering laws
that allow police such wide discretion are very alluring to cities and
states looking for a solution to crime. Does it appear likely that Morales
will end the loitering law discussion? No. Instead, it is likely that in a
few years the Court will accept another loitering case. It is also likely
that once again the law will fall as unconstitutional, but if Justices
O'Connor and Breyer and the three dissenters from Morales are satisfied
that the city has made the changes noted above, the Court may find the
statute to be valid.
JERRITT FARRAR
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